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Abstract
We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a
principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over
time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the
manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the man-
ager in the future. The optimal incentive scheme entails an inefficiently high
turnover rate in the early stages of the employment relationship. The op-
timal turnover probability depends on the past performance and the likeli-
hood of turnover decreases gradually with superior performance. With good
enough past performance, the turnover policy reaches efficiency; the manager
is never retained if it is inefficient to do so. The manager’s compensation de-
pends on the firm value and the optimal performance-compensation relation
increases with past performance.
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mance
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1 Introduction
An extensive literature discusses the impact of the CEO ability on the firm value.
Following weak performance, the CEO is replaced in a hope of finding a new man-
ager who is better able to choose the right management strategy to enhance the
firm value. However, empirical literature documents that the CEO turnover deci-
sions do not only depend on the firm value, but the probability of the CEO turnover
decreases with tenure. In particular, Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda (2014) report
that the turnover probability decreases with superior performance. Furthermore,
Cremers and Palia (2011) find that a CEO’s pay to performance increases with
tenure. Thus, CEO compensation increases with both the firm value and the
length of the manager’s employment in the firm.
We show that the decrease in turnover probability is a consequence of an asym-
metric information problem between the firm owner (principal) and the manager
(agent): the manager is compensated for his efforts by promising him a higher job
security in the future. Surprisingly, the turnover policy is never too lenient; the
manager is never retained if it is inefficient to do so. In contrast, the model pre-
dicts an inefficiently high turnover rate for managers with shorter tenure. More-
over, the model predicts an increasing pay-to-performance over time that is con-
sistent with empirical predictions.
To be more concrete, this paper studies the managerial compensation and
turnover in a model with a firm and a manager in which the manager’s actions
have long-term consequences. The value of the firm under the current manage-
ment depends both on the manager’s past efforts and on exogenous circumstances.
By investing in the firm, the manager has the opportunity to increase the quality
of the match between himself and the firm. The manager’s investment is produc-
tive and increases the firm value under the current management. This captures
the additional value that the right choice of manager adds to the firm profit. The
model includes a learning-by-doing component: higher managerial effort today
increases the firm profit in all future periods.
Our starting point is a dynamic model with a principal (firm owner) and an
agent (manager). Both players are risk-neutral, but the agent is protected by lim-
ited liability. Limited liability implies that the contract cannot impose negative
payments to the agent, and that eventual losses have to be covered by the princi-
pal. The firm produces a stochastic output that is serially correlated over time.1
The agent can exert effort to increase the quality of the match and thereby the
firm profit. Effort is unobserved by the principal and related with opportunity
cost for the agent. If the agent shirks, he receives a private benefit. To prevent
1We assume that there is a one-to-one mapping between the quality of the match between the
players and the output under the current manager.
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the agent from enjoying private benefits, the principal has to reward him for good
performance and punish him following low outcomes. Since the manager’s quality
within the current firm is correlated over time, the agent’s actions have long-term
consequences. Shirking today decreases the firm profit under the current man-
ager for all future periods.
At any point in time, the firm has the opportunity to fire the manager and
hire a new one. If the firm replaces the manager, a new one is drawn from a time
invariant distribution. Thus, we assume that both the expected firm value and
the expected manager’s utility following a turnover is constant while the value of
the firm under the current manager depends on both the past performance and
on the manager’s effort. The firm potentially has two motivations to replace the
manager. Firstly, the new manager eventually provides a better match to the firm,
such that turnover is efficient. Secondly, the turnover threat provides the agent
incentives to exert effort. Vice versa, the firm can reward the manager for good
performance by promising him a higher level of job security in the future.
Turnover is efficient if the quality of the match falls too low, and the optimal
contract never retains the manager unless it is efficient to do so. The optimal
dynamic contract between the firm owner and the manager implies that the man-
ager’s compensation increases and the probability of turnover decreases with su-
perior performance. In particular, we find that the optimal long-term contract
entails an inefficiently high turnover rate that is needed to provide the manager
incentives in the beginning of the employment. Following superior performance,
the turnover threat is relaxed and the manager is rewarded by promising him a
higher job security in future periods. The manager’s compensation depends both
on the firm value and on the tenure level. Finally, we find strong evidence in-
dicating that tenure decisions correlate with past performance. Tenure does not
only reflect manager’s ability but also rewards him for his past efforts on the firm
development.
We build on the leading continuous-time model by DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006) and extend the model to allow for the output to be serially correlated over
time. DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) derive the optimal contract in a discrete-time
version of the model and provide theoretical foundations for deriving renegotiation-
proof contracts. Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007) prove that the discrete
time counterpart of the model converges to its continuous-time limit. Allowing for
serial correlation is essential to examine efficiency of turnover decisions. With
uncorrelated output, turnover is never efficient. In such a framework, an ineffi-
ciently high retention rate is never feasible.
The empirical fact that turnover decisions become more lenient over time is
often interpreted as a consequence of managerial entrenchment in the literature.
In their seminal paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) predict that managers attempt
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to gain power by choosing specific investments that enhance their value inside
the firm when compared to outsiders. As a consequence, the model predicts an
inefficiently low turnover rate for managers with longer tenure.
This paper is not the first examining efficiency of turnover decisions using a
dynamic principal-agent problem as a starting point. Garrett and Pavan (2012)
show than when there is asymmetric information about the manager’s quality,
the optimal contract entails excessive retention of the manager over time.2 The
result follows since uncertainty about the manager’s quality diminishes over time.
Interestingly, the result is in sharp contrast with the predictions of our model that
suggests that the optimal contract never retains the agent if it is inefficient to
do so. Moreover, turnover probability decreases following superior performance,
depending on the entire history of past performance and not only on the current
quality.
Our model is related to several previous papers examining dynamic CEO com-
pensation. In particular, Sannikov (2014) examines a related model in which the
agent’s action affects the future output.3 Our models differ in several important
directions. The optimal contract exhibits a similar dynamics with deferred com-
pensation for the agent. However, in Sannikov, the agent’s risk-aversion implies
that it is optimal to smooth consumption, but determines payment to the agent
following the termination of the employment relationship. Because of the agent’s
risk-neutrality, our model is unable to capture the optimality of smoothing the
manager’s payoff. However, the payoffs terminate with the termination of the
relationship, a fact that is consistent with empirical observations. Finally, the
simplicity of our framework allows us to make more detailed predictions of the
relationship between the optimal compensation and the turnover policy.
This paper is not the first one to examine moral hazard with long-term con-
sequences of the agent’s action. Our model can be seen as a generalization of He
(2009), who derives the optimal contract in a principal-agent model in which the
agent takes a hidden action to affect the firm scale. The agent’s outside option
depends on the firm scale, which allows for an elegant characterization of the
optimal contract using the firm scale as a state variable. We extend the model
to allow for the outside option to be independent of the firm value. The optimal
contract implies a richer dynamics, but is described by a partial differential equa-
tion, which, unfortunately, comes with some loss of tractability. An alternative
approach to model correlation of output was proposed by Kwon (2011) who de-
rives the optimal contract in discrete time by taking joint limits of pairs of sets.4
2Empirical evidence provides stronger support on the turnover decisions reflecting differences
in managerial abilities than managerial entrenchment, see for example Rose and Shepard (1997).
3The model builds on Sannikov (2008) in which the agent’s action only has an instantaneous
effect on the output. Sannikov (2012) provides an excellent survey of the earlier literature.
4See also Kwon (2016).
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While the discrete-time approach allows for a more intuitive characterization of
the recursive contract, the tractability of the continuous-time framework allows
us to consider a model with more than two states of the world that is needed to
make predictions of efficiency of the retention decision.
Our solution concepts borrow from DeMarzo and Sannikov (2011) who exam-
ine a related model in which the players learn about the unknown mean of the
cash-flow process. Our framework differs from theirs in several important dimen-
sions. First, in our model the firm value is known at equilibrium, but stochasti-
cally changes over time. Thus our model has no learning at equilibrium, but the
players are contracting in a changing environment. Besides, in DeMarzo and San-
nikov the agent has persistent private information while the firm value is known
in our framework.
In general, the optimal contracting problem can be arbitrarily complex, be-
cause the optimal decision might depend on the entire history of past returns. To
reduce the complexity, we adopt a classical approach that uses the agent’s con-
tinuation value as a state variable to summarize the dependence of the optimal
contract on the entire history. The reduction allows us to characterize the optimal
contract in a complex economic environment, and is justified by Spear and Srivas-
tava (1987) who show that the agent’s continuation value is a sufficient statistic
for the history in the optimal contract. Besides, because of the serial correlation,
we need a second state variable, the current output, to summarize the firm value.
To model serial correlation of output, we adopt an approach that defines the
cash-flow as the level of a diffusion process, rather than as the increment. In the
principal-agent framework, the approach was first introduced by Williams (2011)
who examines a model in which the output is persistent, and the agent is risk-
averse. Strulovici (2011) extends the model to allow for the players to renegotiate
the contract. Again, our model differs from these important papers by the in-
formation structure: the agent has no persistent information in our framework.
Besides, Strulovici (2011); Williams (2011) allow for a more general utility func-
tion, but do not consider turnover.
2 The Model
We examine a game in which a principal (she) hires an agent (he) who is neces-
sary to operate a company. Time is continuous and the time horizon is infinite.
The principal has access to unlimited funds, but the agent is protected by lim-
ited liability. In our framework this implies that the agent cannot make negative
payments. Both players discount the future by a common rate r > 0.
At any time t during the employment of the current agent, the firm produces
an output xt. The output is stochastic and changes following a standard Brownian
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motion. Formally, the output at period t is
xt = x0+
∫ t
0
asds+
∫ t
0
dZs, (1)
where Z is a standard Brownian motion and at ≤ µ denotes the agent’s effort. At
time 0, the output process starts from the initial value x0 that is common knowl-
edge. (1) implies that E[xt|x0]= x0, i.e., the output follows a Markov process.5
The output process {xt : t ≥ 0} is observed by both players, but the effort {at :
t ≥ 0} is the agent’s private information. (1) implies that actions have long-term
consequences. If the agent shirks today, the firm value is lower in all future peri-
ods. Thus, the model entails a learning-by-doing component: a higher effort today
increases the expected match value between the principal and the agent in the
future. This increases the expected output in the future and therefore the firm
value.
Effort is costly for the agent and shirking generates an instantaneous private
benefit of
λ(µ−at)dt.
We assume that λ ∈ (0,1) such that private benefits are inefficient. Hence shirking
is related with a social loss of 1−λ for each unit of labor.
We abstract away from private savings. Since both players are risk neutral and
discount the future by the same rate, the assumption is without loss of generality.
Any contract with private savings can be replicated by a contract that includes no
private savings that yields the same payoff to the players.6
The principal has the possibility to terminate the agent’s contract and hire
a new agent. If the agent is fired, the principal hires a new agent under which
the firm value is stochastic and depends on the quality of the match with the
new agent. We assume that the expected firm value under the new agent is in-
dependently and identically distributed over time. Termination of the contract
is irreversible such that the old agent returns to the pool of new agents and the
match quality becomes unobserved. Without loss of generality, we normalize the
expected payoff under the new agent to 0, net of the hiring cost of the new agent
and possible firing cost. If the agent is fired, he receives an expected payoff of 0,
which includes the expected cost of finding a new employment and the expected
profit under the new employment contract.
In the beginning of each employment relationship, the players agree on a con-
tract. The contract specifies a nonnegative payment process {dWt ≥ 0 : t≥ 0} from
5The assumption is in sharp contrast with DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) in which the output
is dxt = µdt+σdZt. The expected flow of output is E[dxt]= µdt which is independent of the past
performance.
6See DeMarzo and Fishman (2007); DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) for a formal argument. The
extension to our framework is straightforward.
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the principal to the agent, and a stopping time τ at which the agent’s contract is
terminated. Both the payment process and the stopping time are adapted to the
filtration generated by the public history of the past outcomes, Ft = σ{xs : 0≤ s ≤
t}. We assume that both players can fully commit to the contract.
For any incentive compatible contract, the principal’s total expected profit is
the discounted stream of output xt minus the payments dWt to the agent
v0 =E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(xtdt−dWt)
]
, (2)
where the output xt depends on the agent’s action at as described in (1).
Let U0 denote the agent’s promised utility from the contract at time 0. The
promise-keeping constraint at time 0 guarantees that the agent receives his ex-
pected payoff consisting of the discounted stream of payments
U0 =E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtdWt
]
(3)
under the contract that implements full effort, at =µ for all t≤ τ.
The agent’s incentive compatibility constraint guarantees that the agent re-
ceives at least the same utility for exerting full effort from t onwards than for any
arbitrary effort strategy with {at ≤ µ : t ≤ τ} with an additional stream of private
benefits λ(µ−at). Formally,
U0 ≥Ea
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dWt+λatdt)
]
(4)
almost surely, for all t, and for all for feasible strategies at ≤µ.
The optimal contract determines an intertemporal payment rule and a turnover
policy that satisfy the agent’s promise-keeping condition, the incentive compati-
bility constraints, and the limited liability constraints, and maximize the princi-
pal’s expected payoff. Formally, it chooses a nonnegative payment process W and
a stopping time τ to maximize (2) subject to the constraints (3) and (4), and the
nonnegativity constraints on the payment process.
3 First-Best Solution
We first revisit the solution to the problem when there is no asymmetric informa-
tion. Since both players are risk-neutral and discount the future by the same rate,
the intertemporal allocation of payments is irrelevant for efficiency. The goal is to
determine the optimal match value at which the old agent’s contract is terminated
and a new agent is hired.
7
The first-best value s solves a standard real option problem. The objective is to
choose an optimal stopping time τ, measurable with respect to the output process
xt at time t, to maximize the expected discounted flow of output
s0 =E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtxtdt
]
. (5)
The optimal turnover decision is a threshold policy: the old agent is retained so
long as the match value stays above a certain threshold, xt ≥ x∗, and as soon as it
reaches x∗, it is efficient to turn over the agent.
The efficient turnover policy is the unique solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation
rs(x)= x+µsx(x)+ 12 sxx(x) (6)
with the boundary conditions s(x∗)= 0 and sx(x∗)= 0. The value function s(x) and
the first-best optimal turnover value x∗ can be solved explicitly. The results are
summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1. The agent is retained as long as the match value stays above the
threshold x∗ = 1/α−µ/r with α=−µ−
√
µ2+2r, and a new agent is hired as soon
as the match value reaches x∗. The firm value at any point x ∈ [x∗,∞) is
s(x)= x+µ/r
r
− x
∗+µ/r
r
eα(x−x
∗). (7)
Proof of Proposition 1. We verify that the turnover policy described in Proposition
1 maximizes the firm value. Consider the process
St =
∫ t
0
e−rsxsds+ e−rts(xt). (8)
We show that St is a supermartingale for an arbitrary turnover policy, and a
martingale if the optimal turnover policy is chosen.
Using Itô’s lemma with (1) on (8), we find that
ertdSt = xtdt− rs(xt)dt+µsx(x)+ 12 sxx(xt)dt+ sx(xt)dZt.
By (6), St is a martingale when xt ≥ x∗ and a supermartingale if xt < x∗. The firm
value at time 0 satisfies
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtxtdt
]
=E[Sτ]≤ S0 = s(x0)
with equality if and only if the optimal stopping time is chosen; i.e. τ is reached
as xt reaches x∗.
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4 Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that
the agent exerts full effort at the optimal contract. Since effort is unobserved, the
principal does not know if fluctuations of output are consequences of the agent’s
actions or of exogenous events. This gives rise to a moral hazard problem in our
framework. For the agent to be willing to exert effort, he needs to be compensated
for his lost private benefit.
To provide the agent incentives to exert effort, the principal has to let his con-
tinuation value vary with the fluctuations of the output. Following the standards
in the literature, we start by specifying how the agent’s continuation value Ut de-
pends on his actions. In continuous time, the agent’s continuation value admits a
convenient representation as a stochastic process.
At t≤ τ, the agent’s continuation value is
Ut =E t
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(dWs+λ(µ−as)ds)
]
(9)
for any incentive compatible contract that implements the effort {as ≤µ : t≤ s≤ τ}
by the agent. (9) is sometimes called the agent’s promise-keeping constraint. It
is a book-keeping constraint that guarantees that the agent receives his promised
value at the optimal contract.
We first determine how the agent’s continuation value evolves for an arbitrary
effort strategy {a˜s : 0≤ s≤ τ} when the principal wants to implement the particular
effort {as : 0≤ s≤ τ}. Then we derive conditions for the agent to choose full effort,
a˜t =µ for all t≤ τ. Later we will show that it is indeed optimal for the principal to
implement full effort.
The following lemma describes how the agent’s promised value Ut evolves in
response to his action
Lemma 1. Fix a contract {a,W ,τ} with Ut < ∞ for all t. The process Ut is the
agent’s continuation value from the contract if and only if the following conditions
are satisfied. (i) At t≤ τ, Ut admits the representation
dUt = rUtdt−dWt+βt(dxt−at). (10)
β is a progressively measurable process in L∗ that describes the sensitivity of the
agent’s continuation value to his effort.7 (ii) Ut satisfies the transversality condi-
tion lim
s→∞E t[1s≤τe
−rsUt+s]= 0 almost everywhere.
Proof. See, for example, Sannikov (2008).
7A process β is in L∗ if E
[∫ t
0 1s≤τβ
2
s ds
]
<∞.
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To derive conditions, that guarantee that the agent exerts full effort, we com-
pare his payoff from the full effort strategy at = µ to the payoff from an arbitrary
effort strategy with a˜t ≤ µ. If the agent shirks, he earns an additional flow of
private benefits
λ(µ− a˜t)dt. (11)
However, he loses a flow compensation of
βt(µ− a˜t)dt (12)
that he would have received from the principal if he had exerted higher effort. By
comparing (11) and (12), we find that, for the agent to be willing to exert effort,
his continuation value has to increase by βt ≥λ for each unit of effort required.
The result is summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 2. A necessary and sufficient condition for at =µ to be incentive com-
patible is that βt ≥λ for all t≤ τ.
Proof. Using the standard argument we can write the agent’s incentive compati-
bility constraint as
U0 ≥U0+Ea˜
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dWt+λ(µ− a˜t)−dWt−βt(µ− a˜t)dt)
]
,
or,
−Ea˜
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(βt−λ)(µ− a˜t)dt
]
≤ 0.
Since a˜t ≤µ, a˜t =µ is incentive compatible if and only if βt ≥λ.
5 Optimal Contract
We next turn to the principal’s problem of determining the optimal contract. This
section presents a heuristic discussion; the Appendix verifies the optimal contract.
Since shirking is always inefficient, the optimal contract implements full effort by
the agent. The incentive constraints bind and the payments are delayed until
the first-best optimal turnover policy can be reached. Then the agent is rewarded
with a compensation that depends on the firm value.
5.1 Contract Dynamics
Using the results obtained in Section 4, we can write the optimal contracting
problem as one of maximizing the expected flow of outputs xt minus the flow of
payments Wt to the agent
v(U , x)=max E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(xtdt−dWt)
]
10
subject to the state variables xt and Ut evolving according to (1) and (10), the
transversality condition
lim
s→∞E t[1s≤τe
−rsUt+s]= 0
almost everywhere, and the feasibility, incentive compatibility and limited liabil-
ity constraints
at ≤µ, βt ≥λ and dWt ≥ 0 for all t≤ τ.
5.1.1 Payment Policy
The optimal contract relies on an inefficient turnover threat to provide the agent
incentives. In particular, if the agent’s continuation value falls too low, his con-
tract is terminated and a new agent is hired. Delaying payments to the agent
increases his continuation value for the future, which reduces the risk of ineffi-
cient turnover. Delaying payments is optimal until the efficient turnover policy
can be reached.
Since the agent is risk-neutral, the marginal cost of providing him immediate
income is −1. The marginal cost of increasing the agent’s continuation value is
lower whenever the inefficient termination threat is reduced. Indeed, we find
that if8
vU (U , x)≥−1, (13)
it is optimal to set dWt = 0. The payments to the agent are delayed, and the
principal rewards him by promising a higher continuation value for the future.9
Delaying payments to the agent is optimal until his continuation value grows
high enough such that the first-best optimal turnover policy can be reached. Let
UFB(xt) denote the smallest continuation value of the agent that reaches the first-
best optimal turnover policy when the current match value is xt. If Ut <UFB(xt),
the principal can gain by increasing the agent’s continuation value. The payments
to the agent are delayed until Ut reaches UFB(xt), and the first-best solution is
attainable. Thereafter Ut =UFB(xt), and the agent is rewarded with immediate
income. The optimal contract avoids inefficient turnover and attains the first-best
solution. Lemma 2 below verifies that the first-best boundary is finite.
5.1.2 Full Effort Implemented
We next discuss the optimal contract in the region (U , x) in which the first-best
optimal turnover policy cannot be attained. Then dWt = 0 and the principal’s
8See the discussion below Lemma 3 in the Appendix for a more precise explanation.
9Notice that since vU (UFB, x)=−1 and v(U , x) is concave, the optimal contract that maximizes
the principal’s profit does not reach the first-best solution at time 0.
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optimal choice of {a,β} at any point can be derived from her Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation
rv(U , x)= max
a≤µ,β≥λ
{
x+ rUvU (U , x)+avx(U , x)
+β
2
2
vUU (U , x)+βvUx(U , x)+ 12vxx(U , x)
}
. (14)
The boundary condition is v(0, x)= 0. Because of limited liability, U cannot become
negative. If the agent’s continuation value decreases to 0, the only way to provide
him incentives to exert effort is to terminate his contract. Besides, since the agent
is risk-neutral, it is (weakly) suboptimal to deliver him income after τ. There-
fore, it is without loss of generality to concentrate on contracts that terminate the
agent’s contract if his continuation value hits 0.
We show that the optimal contract implements full effort by the agent. Imple-
menting full effort is optimal because cash-flows are valuable. Additional effort
increases expected cash-flow, which is anticipated by the principal. For any in-
centive compatible contract, the agent’s total value follows a martingale and any
deviation from the expected value becomes as a surprise. As a consequence, all
additional rents can be extracted from the agent. Indeed, (14) implies that imple-
menting the full effort a=µ is optimal since
vx(U , x)≥ 0, (15)
as confirmed by Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
5.1.3 Incentive Constraints Bind
To show that the incentive constraints bind at the optimum, we adopt the fol-
lowing approach, borrowed from DeMarzo and Sannikov (2011). We compare the
principal’s profit from the contract with β= λ with her profit from any other con-
tract with β≥λ. We show that the contract with β=λ attains the highest feasible
profit for the principal.
For β= λ, the principal’s Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (14) can be writ-
ten as
rv(U , x)= x+ rUvU (U , x)+µvx(U , x)
+ λ
2
2
vUU (U , x)+λvUx(U , x)+ 12vxx(U , x). (16)
By comparing (14) and (16), we find that β=λ is optimal if and only if
1
2
(β−λ)2vUU (U , x)+ (β−λ)(λvUU (U , x)+vUx(U , x))≤ 0. (17)
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We analyze the two terms of (17) separately.
The first term of (17) is familiar from related models with independently dis-
tributed output, see in particular, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). As we can see
from (10), β determines the volatility of the agent’s continuation value Ut. If Ut
is more volatile, the risk that it hits 0 is higher, an event that corresponds to the
termination of the agent’s contract. Excess volatility of the agent’s continuation
value increases the risk of inefficient turnover, which is costly for the principal.
Indeed, Lemma 6 in the Appendix shows that
(β−λ)2vUU (U , x)≤ 0, (18)
which is maximized at β=λ. The principal optimally exposes the firm to the min-
imal inefficient contract termination risk that is necessary to sustain incentives.
The second term in (17) is new, and arises because the agent’s actions have
long-term consequences. Recall that vU (U , x) describes the marginal cost of pro-
viding the agent incentives. The second term in (17) describes how the marginal
cost changes when the state variables U and x increase, but the instantaneous
turnover risk is held constant.10 Marginal cost of providing incentives (weakly)
decreases in this direction since the boundary moves away from the first-best.
Indeed, Lemma 7 in the Appendix together with β≥λ implies that
(β−λ)(λvUU (U , x)+vUx(U , x))≤ 0. (19)
(17) together with (18) and (19) imply that β=λ at the optimum. Principal always
terminates the manager’s contract at the lowest match value that is compatible
with incentives.
5.1.4 Characterization of the Optimal Contract
The optimal contract relies on an inefficient turnover threat to provide the agent
incentives. It delays payments in the beginning, and rewards him for high higher
outputs by increasing his continuation value for the future. With good past per-
formance, the continuation value eventually becomes high enough such that the
first-best solution can be reached. In particular, the turnover policy becomes effi-
cient. The agent starts to receive payments contingent on the firm value.
The final step is to verify that the first-best boundary is finite when the output
follows the Markov process (1).11 In particular, we consider a payment schedule
10To see this, consider the case in which the agent is always rewarded with immediate payments.
In that case one can show that the distance between the current match value and the one at which
turnover occurs, stays constant, cf. Lemma 7 in the Appendix.
11If the output process is uncorrelated over time but has an unbounded support, an unbounded
continuation value is needed to implement the first-best solution. Cf. DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006); Biais et al. (2007).
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that compensates the agent for high performance by making him an immediate
payment. That is,
dWt = rUtdt. (20)
We now show that the agent’s continuation value, that is needed to implement the
first-best solution, is bounded above by12
U¯t =λ(xt− x∗). (21)
In particular, (21) is nonnegative for any xt ≥ x∗ such that the manager’s limited
liability constraint is not violated. The next lemma verifies that the resulting
contract is incentive compatible for all xt ≥ x∗.
Lemma 2. At the optimal contract, UFB(xt)<∞ for all t≥ 0 and all x≥ x∗.
Proof. As noted in the text, U¯t(xt)≥ 0 for all x ≥ x∗ such that xt hits x∗ before Ut
hits 0. We show that if Ut = U¯t, the contract is incentive compatible. Consider the
process
A¯t =
∫ t
0
e−rt(dWt+λ(µ−at))+ e−rtU¯t.
We need to show that A¯t is a supermartingale for all at ≤µ.
Using Ito’s lemma and (10) with βt =λ, we find that
ert A¯t = dWt+λ(µ−at)dt− rU¯tdt+dU¯t =λ(µ−at)dt+λ(dxt−µdt)=λdZt.
This verifies that, At is a martingale for all strategies. Then indeed,
A¯t =E t[A¯τ]
which implies that
U¯t =E t
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(dWt+λ(µ−at)dt)
]
.
This implies that if the agent’s continuation value is (21), the agent is indifferent
between his strategies. In particular, the contract, that implements full effort by
the agent, is incentive compatible.
The optimal contract that implements full effort is summarized in the follow-
ing theorem
12The method borrows from Williams (2011), see also Sannikov (2014) who use a similar argu-
ment to verify sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility. Notice that here (21) is a (strict)
upper bound for UFB(xt). In particular, we show that the agent is indifferent between his strate-
gies.
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Theorem 1. Starting from the initial match quality x0 > x∗, and the agent’s ini-
tial value U0 ∈ (0,UFB(x0)), the optimal contract attains the profit v(U0, x0) for the
principal. The players’ values evolve stochastically in response to the fluctuations
of the output, and admit the following dynamics:
1. When Ut ∈ (0,UFB(x)), it evolves according to
dUt = rUtdt+λdZt. (22)
The payments to the agent are delayed, i.e. dWt = 0. The principal’s expected
profit at any point is v(U , x), which is the unique solution of the following
partial differential equation
rv(U , x)= x+ rUvU (U , x)+µvx(U , x)
+ λ
2
2
vUU (U , x)+λvUx(U , x)+ 12vxx(U , x) (23)
with the boundary conditions vU (UFB(x), x)=−1, vFB(x)+UFB(x)= s(x) and
v(0, x)= 0.
2. When Ut reaches UFB(xt), the first-best solution is implemented. The agent
receives a payment dWt = Ut −UFB(xt). At any point, the firm value is
v(x,U)+U = s(x) = (x+µ/r)/r − (x∗ +µ/r)/reα(x−x∗) with x∗ = 1/α−µ/r and
α=−µ−
√
µ2+2r.
3. When Ut reaches 0, the current agent’s contract is terminated. The players
receive their expected values v(0, x)= 0, and U = 0 from the new employment
contract.
5.2 Tenure and Job Security
In this section, we discuss formally how the manager’s tenure increases job se-
curity at the optimal contract. In particular, we argue that the turnover policy
becomes more lenient over time. Let U10 =U∗0 (x0) denote the value at which the
principal optimally hires the manager 1 at time 0. Consider a later time t> 0 such
that the manager 1 is still employed and xt = x0. Then by (22), we have
U1t −U10 =
∫ t
0
rU1s ds+λ
∫ t
0
dZs =
∫ t
0
rU1s ds≥ 0
since xt = x0. Thus, U1t ≥U∗0 (xt). Now consider the principal’s problem of hiring
a different manager of the same match value xt at time t. Then clearly, U2t (xt) =
U∗0 (x0)≤U1t .
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Let τ1 denote the turnover policy determined in the manager 1’s contract and
τ2 the turnover policy determined by the manager 2’s contract and define τ =
τ1∧τ2.13 We argue that τ1 ≥ τ2. To see this, use (22) to write
U1τ −U2τ =
∫ τ
0
r(U1s −U2s )ds+λ
∫ τ
0
(dZs−dZs)≥ 0;
for any path of the Brownian motion {Zs : t ≤ s ≤ τ}. This implies that U2 hits 0
no later than U1 and, therefore, τ1 ≥ τ2. Turnover policy becomes more lenient
over time such that the manager’s job security increases with tenure. Notice that
increasing job security is part of the optimal contract and not a consequence of the
agent’s actions. This verifies that job security may increase over time even if the
manager does not engage in inefficient entrenchment activities.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in
a framework with learning-by-doing. We find that the optimal contract is of the
following form. In the beginning of the relationship, the payments to the manager
are delayed, and the contract relies on an inefficient turnover threat to sustain
incentive compatibility. Payments to the manager are delayed until his continua-
tion value becomes sufficiently high. Then the first-best solution is implemented,
and the manager starts to receive payments.
Our results deliver interesting insights to the optimal turnover policy that are
in contrast with previous theoretical findings. In particular, the manager is never
retained if it is inefficient to do so. The optimal contract implies an inefficiently
high turnover rate in the beginning of the employment relationship and the likeli-
hood of performance-related dismissal decreases with superior performance. Also,
the relative pay for performance increases with past performance. The resulting
dynamics is well in line with empirical evidence.
13We let τ1∧τ2 denote the minimum of the stopping times τ1 and τ2.
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7 Appendix
The appendix verifies that the contract conjectured in Section 5 is optimal for the
principal. We show that it is optimal for the principal to request full effort by
the agent and solve the principal’s optimization problem subject to the incentive
constraints. The method, that we use to show that the incentive constraints bind,
borrow from DeMarzo and Sannikov (2011). We show that the principal’s profit is
maximized if she sets βt =λ for all t≤ τ.
The proof proceeds as follows
• Show that marginal cost of implementing effort is nonnegative.
• Show that the principal’s value function is concave in the agent’s value and
nonincreasing in the agent’s share of the implemented effort.
• Verify that the contract in Theorem 1 attains the highest feasible profit in
the principal’s problem.
We start by introducing a series of Lemmas that examine some key properties
of the principal’s value function v(U0, x0). We then use the properties to verify
that the contract described in Theorem 1 is optimal for the principal.
The next lemma show that the marginal value of implementing effort is non-
negative
Lemma 3. v(U , x) is nondecreasing in x.
Proof. Consider the processes (U is , x
i
s)s≥0, i = 1,2, that follow (1) and (22) starting
from the values that satisfy
x10− x20 = δ> 0 and U10 =U20 ≥ 0. (24)
Let τ1 ≡ τ(U1) and τ2 ≡ τ(U2). (22) together with (24) implies that U1t =U2t for all
t, and therefore, τ≡ τ1 = τ2. Then
v(U , x1)−v(U , x2)=E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(x1t − x2t )dt
]
=E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtδdt
]
≥ 0
almost surely. The result follows since δ was chosen arbitrarily.
The next Lemmas show that the principal’s value is concave in the agent’s
value and that principal’s value is nonincreasing in the agent’s marginal share
of implemented effort. The methods that we use to derive the properties borrow
from DeMarzo and Sannikov (2011). In particular, we show that the principal’s
value function satisfies the following conditions
vUU (U , x)≤ 0, (25)
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and
λvUU (U , x)+vUx(U , x)≤ 0 (26)
for all (U , x). Moreover, since vUU (Ut, xt) ≤ 0 and vU (Ut, xt) = −1 if Ut ≥UFB(xt),
vU (Ut, xt)≥−1 for all Ut.14
The intuition behind the results is straightforward. As discussed in the text,
(25) implies that the principal wants to minimize the inefficient turnover threat.
If the agent’s continuation value hits 0, the limited liability constraint becomes
binding and the contract is terminated. The higher the volatility of the agent’s
continuation value, the more it fluctuates, and higher is the risk that 0 is hit. The
principal’s value function is concave in the agent’s continuation value.
Recall that vU (U , x) describes the principal’s marginal cost of providing the
agent incentives. (26) describes how the marginal cost changes if we increase
U and x such that dU /dx = λ. The marginal cost is is nonincreasing since the
possibility of delaying payments results in reduction of the termination risk.
The next lemma provides useful information about the evolution of vU (U , x)
Lemma 4. Given that the state of the world (Ut, xt) evolves according to (1) and
(22), vU (Ut, xt) is a martingale.
Proof. Differentiating (23) with respect to U , we find that
rvU (U , x)= rvU (U , x)+ rUvUU (U , x)+µvxU (U , x)
+ λ
2
2
vUUU (U , x)+λvUUx(U , x)+ 12vUxx(U , x)
or,
0= rUvUU (U , x)+µvxU (U , x)+ λ
2
2
vUUU (U , x)+λvUUx(U , x)+ 12vUxx(U , x). (27)
Moreover, applying Itô’s lemma with (1) and (22) on vU (Ut, xt), we can see that
the right hand side of (27) corresponds to its drift when Ut ≤UFB (xt). Therefore,
vU (Ut, xt) is a martingale on that range.
Furthermore, if Ut ≥UFB (xt), vU (Ut, xt) = −1 such that vU (Ut, xt) is again a
martingale. The result follows by combining.
The next lemma shows the marginal gain from continuation is higher for
higher levels of xt
Lemma 5. vU (0, x) is increasing in x.
14The result can be seen graphically: Since vU (Ut, xt) is (weakly) decreasing, and we know that
it is −1 from Ut ≥UFB(xt) onwards, we must have vU (Ut, xt)≥−1. Otherwise vU (Ut, xt) would not
be decreasing.
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Proof. Consider two processes (U it , x
i
t)s≥t, starting from the values U
1
0 =U20 = ε,
and x10 = x20+δ, for some ε> 0 and δ> 0. Let τ1 ≡ τ(U1) and τ2 ≡ τ(U2).
Suppose first that U iτ <UFB(xiτ). Since U10 =U20 , we have by (22) for any corre-
sponding path of the Brownian motion that
U1t −U2t =U10 −U20︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∫ t
0
r(U1s −U2s )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
ds+
∫ t
0
λ(dx1s −dx2s )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0.
Now since U1t =U2t for all t, τ(U1) = τ(U2) ≡ τ. Substituting in the principal’s
value function, we find that
v(ε, x10)−v(ε, x20)=E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(x1t − x2t )dt
]
−U10 +U20
=E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(x10− x20)dt
]
−ε+ε=E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtδdt
]
> 0.
Next, suppose that U2t =UFB(x2t ). Then it follows by (22) that U1t ≥U2t . Then
we find that τ1 ≥ τ2, and
v(ε, x10)−v(ε, x20)=E
[∫ τ1
0
e−rtx1t dt
]
−E
[∫ τ2
0
e−rtx2t dt
]
−ε+ε
=E
[∫ τ2
0
e−rtδdt
]
+E
[∫ τ1
τ2
e−rtx1t dt
]
> 0.
The second term in the last line is nonnegative since
E
[∫ τ1
τ2
e−rtx1t dt
]
= v(U1
τ2
, x1
τ2
)+U1
τ2
≥ v(U1
τ2
, x1
τ2
)≥ 0.
The first inequality follows since U1
τ2
≥ 0 by limited liability. The second inequality
follows since v(U1
τ2
, x1
τ2
)≥ 0; otherwise, the principal would be better of terminat-
ing the contract.
Then
v(U1, x1)−v(U2, x2)=E
[∫ τ1
0
e−rtx1t dt
]
−E
[∫ τ2
0
e−rtx2t dt
]
− (U10 −U20 )= δ> 0.
By combining we find that
v
(
ε, x10
)> v (ε, x20)
⇐⇒ v (ε, x10)> v (ε, x20)
⇐⇒ v (ε, x10)−v (0, x10)> v (ε, x20)−v (0, x20) .
The result follows since δ and ε were chosen arbitrarily.
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The next lemma implies that vUU (U , x)≤ 0.
Lemma 6. vU (U , x) is nonincreasing in U.
Proof. We show that for any x0, and for any two values U10 > U20 , vU (U1t , xt) ≤
vU (U2t , xt). Consider two processes (U
i
s , x
i
s)s≥0, i = 1,2. Suppose that xi0 = x0, but
that U10 =U20 +δ. Let τ1 ≡ τ(U1) and τ2 ≡ τ(U2) denote the first time at which each
process reaches 0.
We need to consider three cases, depending on if U it has reached U
FB(xit) before
τ. First, suppose that UFB(x1t )=UFB(x2t ) for all t≤ τ. Then
x1
τ1
= x2
τ2
= x∗.
Second, suppose that UFB(xt)=U1t >U2t for all t≤ τ. Then
x∗ = x1
τ1
< x2
τ2
.
Third, suppose that U it < UFB(xt) for all t ≤ τ. Since UFB(xt) > U1t > U2t , it
holds by (22) for any such path of the Brownian motion that
U1t −U2t =U10 −U20︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δ
+
∫ t
0
r(U1s −U2s )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
ds+
∫ t
0
λ(dxs−dxs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≥ δ.
That is, U1t > U2t for all t ≤ (τ1 ∧ τ2). Therefore, for any path of the Brownian
motion, the process U1 always reaches 0 later than the process U2. This implies
that τ1 > τ2.
Moreover, (22) implies that
U1
τ1
=U10 +
∫ τ1
0
rU1s ds+
∫ τ1
0
λdx1s ,
U2
τ2
=U20 +
∫ τ2
0
rU2s ds+
∫ τ2
0
λdx2s .
By combining, reorganizing, and using the assumption that x10 = x20 we find that
λ(x2
τ2
− x1
τ1
)=U10 −U20 +
∫ τ2
0
r(U1s −U2s )ds+
∫ τ1
τ2
rU1s ds≥ δ,
from which it follows that x1
τ1
< x2
τ2
.
Combining the results we find that x1
τ1
≤ x2
τ2
. Using Lemmas 4 and 5, we obtain
vU (U10 , x0)=E[vU (0, x1τ1)]≤E[vU (0, x2τ2)]= vU (U20 , x0).
with equality only if U i0 =UFB(xi0).
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The next lemma implies that λvUx(U , x)+vUU (U , x)≤ 0
Lemma 7. vU (U , x) is nonincreasing in the direction in which U and x increase
according to dU /dx=λ.
Proof. Consider the processes (U is , x
i
s)s≥0, i = 1,2, that follow (1) and (22) starting
from the values that satisfy
x10− x20 = δ> 0 and U10 −U20 =λδ.
Again, let τ1 ≡ τ(U1) and τ2 ≡ τ(U2).
If U1t =UFB(x1t )≥U2t , we can repeat the steps in the proof of Lemma 6 to show
that
x∗ = x1
τ1
≤ x2
τ2
.
Suppose that U it <UFB(xit). Reasoning along the same lines than earlier, we
can use (22) to write
U1t −U2t =U10 −U20︸ ︷︷ ︸
=λδ
+
∫ t
0
r(U1s −U2s )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
ds+
∫ t
0
λ(dx1s −dx2s )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≥λδ
Hence, for any path of the Brownian motion and t> 0,
U1t −U2t ≥λδ.
Moreover, τ1 > τ2.
Next,
U1
τ2
−U2
τ2︸︷︷︸
=0
≥λδ
⇐⇒ U1
τ2
−U1
τ1︸︷︷︸
=0
≥λδ,
or, using (22) again
−(U1
τ1
−U1
τ2
)=−
∫ τ1
τ2
(rU1t dt+λdx1t )≥λδ.
By rewriting we find that
λ(x1
τ2
− x1
τ1
)≥λδ+
∫ τ1
τ2
rU1t dt≥λδ
from which it follows that x1
τ2
≥ x1
τ1
+δ.
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Moreover, it follows from the assumption that x10 − x20 = δ and (1) that x1τ2 =
x2
τ2
+δ. By combining the results, we can conclude that x2
τ2
> x1
τ1
.
Finally, combine the results to find that x1
τ1
≤ x2
τ2
. Using Lemmas 4 and 5,
vU (U10 , x
1
0)=E[vU (0, x1τ1)]≤E[vU (0, x2τ2)]= vU (U20 , x20).
with equality only if U i0 =UFB(xi0).
We use the properties of the value function v(U0, x0) to verify the contract in
Theorem 1 The result is summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 3. The optimal contract attains the profit v(U0, x0) for the principal,
where v(U0, x0) is as defined in Theorem 1. Any alternative contract attains at most
the profit v(U0, x0).
Proof. We verify that
• The payments to the agent are delayed until the contract achieves the first-
best solution.
• The contract with βt =λ attains the profit v(U0, x0) for the principal.
• An arbitrary contract with βt ≥ λ attains at most the profit v(U0, x0) for the
principal.
Consider the process
Pt = e−rtv(Ut, xt)+
∫ t
0
e−rs(xsds−dWs). (28)
The state variables xt and Ut evolve according to (1) and (10). To prove the result
of Proposition 3, we show that for an arbitrary at ≤ µ, βt ≥ λ and dWt ≥ 0, Pt is a
supermartingale. It is a martingale if and only if at = µ, βt = λ for all t ≤ τ, and
dWt = 0 whenever vU (Ut, xt)>−1.
Using Itô’s lemma on (28), taking the expectations, and multiplying by ert, we
can write
ertE [dPt]= xtdt−dWt−rv(Ut, xt)dt+(rUtdt−dWt−λ(µ−at)dt)vU (Ut, xt)+atvx(U , x)dt
+ β
2
t
2
vUU (Ut, xt)dt+βtvUx(Ut, xt)dt+ 12vxx(Ut, xt)dt.
Adding (23) we find that
ertE [dPt]=−r(1+vU (Ut, xt))dWt− (µ−at)(λvU (U , x)+vx(U , x))dt
+ 1
2
(
β2t −λ2
)
vUU (Ut, xt)dt+βt
(
βt−λ
)
vUx(Ut, xt)dt.
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or,
ertE [dPt]=−r(1+vU (Ut, xt))dWt− (µ−at)(λvU (U , x)+vx(U , x))dt
+ 1
2
(
βt−λ
)2 vUU (Ut, xt)dt+ (βt−λ) (λvUU (Ut, xt)dt+vUx(Ut, xt))dt. (29)
First, Lemma 3 together with the feasibility constraint at ≤µ implies that
−(µ−at)(λvU (U , x)+vx(U , x))≤ 0,
with equality only if at =µ. Next, since wt ≥ 0, vU (U , x)≥−1 implies that
−r(1+vU (Ut, xt))wt ≤ 0,
with equality only if wt = 0 whenever vU (Ut, xt)>−1.
Moreover, since
vUU (Ut, xt)≤ 0
by Lemma 6, the second term of (29) is nonpositive, and it is 0 if βt = λ. Finally,
since βt ≥λ, and
λvUU (Ut, xt)+vUx(Ut, xt)≤ 0
by Lemma 7, the last term of (29) is always nonpositive, and it is 0 if βt =λ. There-
fore, Pt is a supermartingale for an arbitrary contract that satisfy the feasibility,
limited liability and incentive compatibility constraints, and a martingale if the
contract in Theorem 1 is chosen.
Moreover, notice that for Ut ≥UFB(xt), vU (Ut, xt)=−1, and vUU (Ut, xt)= vUx(Ut, xt)=
0. Therefore, (23) can be rewritten as
r(v(Ut, xt)+Ut)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=s(xt)
= x+ 1
2
vxx(Ut, xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sxx(xt)
.
From the analysis of Section 3 we know that the principal optimally lets Ut hit
0 at the same time that xt hits x∗. That is, whenever Ut reaches UFB(xt), it is
optimal to implement the first-best solution as described in Proposition 1.
The next step is to evaluate the principal’s profit for an arbitrary contract.
That is,
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rs(xsds−dWs)ds
]
=E [Pτ]≤ P0 = v(U0, x0),
with equality if and only if the optimal contract is chosen. This implies that the
principal achieves the profit P0 if he chooses the optimal contract, and at most
the profit P0 if he chooses any other contract that satisfies the constraints of the
program. Therefore, the contract in Theorem 1 attains the highest feasible profit
for the principal.
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Theorem 1 now follows by combining the results.
Proof of Theorem 1. Follows from Proposition 3.
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